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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
TED CHARLES HANSEN, : Case No. 960516-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment 
of conviction entered July 15, 1996. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I: Did Instruction 22 stating that "any act in 
furtherance of arranging to distribute a controlled substance is 
a criminal offense" allow the jury to convict Hansen without 
finding that he had the requisite statutory intent? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's jury instructions 
on the elements of a crime are reviewed under a correctness 
standard. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) . 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel objected to the 
admission of Instruction 22 on the grounds that it reduced the 
burden of proof the State had to meet because it did not 
accurately state the actus reus or mens rea of the offense. 
R. 623. 
ISSUE II: Did Instruction 21 incorrectly define the 
actus reus of arranging to distribute a controlled substance? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appropriate standard of review 
for a trial court's interpretation of statutory law and the 
propriety of jury instructions is correction of error. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 
362, 363-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel objected to the 
admission of Instruction 21 on the grounds that the definition of 
"arranging" was incorrect, over broad, and in conflict with State 
v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). R. 622-23. 
ISSUE III: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain 
Hansen's conviction of arranging to distribute cocaine? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will reverse a criminal 
case for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: After the close of the State's 
case, defense counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds that the 
State had failed to make a prima facie showing that Hansen had 
arranged to distribute cocaine. R. 569-75. 
ISSUE IV: Did the trial court err by admitting evidence 
of Hansen's statements to undercover FBI agents that he knew 
people who could sell them other controlled substances under 
2 
Rules 404(b) and 403 to prove intent? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's decision to admit 
evidence under Rule 404(b) is reviewed with "very limited 
deference, according it a relatively small degree of discretion." 
State v. Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah 1997). Though 
the issue is not reviewed de novo, the trial court's 
justification for admitting evidence under 404(b) will be closely 
reviewed. Id. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel filed a motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of Hansen's statements to undercover 
agents regarding his ability to procure controlled substances. 
R. 28-30. A hearing was held on May 1, 1996 where defense 
counsel argued that the evidence was not admissible under Rules 
404(b) and 4 03. R. 218-219. 
TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes and rules is contained in Addendum A: 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1994) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hansen was convicted after a two-day jury trial of 
3 
Unlawful Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting, or 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, Cocaine, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) 
(1994), in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County. On July 15, 1996, Judge David S. Young sentenced Hansen 
to serve a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
FACTS 
On August 2, 1994, Ted Hansen ("Hansen") accompanied 
Thomas Walker ("Walker") and Tim Ingram ("Ingram"), a paid 
government informant, to 1063 East 33 00 South in Salt Lake 
County. Unknown to Hansen and Walker, FBI agents had hidden a 
video camera at the site to record conversations between 
themselves, Hansen, Ingram, and Walker.1 R. 477-79, 487. 
Ingram did not testify. Though the FBI had paid Ingram $1,000 
for his cooperation, they did not know his whereabouts at the 
time of trial. R. 516. When Hansen and Walker arrived, Agent 
Vince Garcia ("Garcia") asked them if they were wearing wires or 
had weapons outside the door and demonstrated to them that he was 
not wearing a wire by pulling up his shirt. R. 558. 
Once inside, Agent Richard Rasmussen ("Rasmussen") 
offered Hansen a beer, telling him he was a concrete contractor 
1
. The entire incident was video taped. A partially redacted 
copy of the video was submitted into evidence by the State. There 
is no written transcript of the video. However, in the left hand 
corner of the video a clock is running. Appellant will refer to 
the video tape as "VT" when citing to facts that are contained in 
the video. The numbers appearing after citations to the video 
refer to the time on the video where the reference can be found. 
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who needed employees for a project at the airport. R. 477, 489-
90, 493; VT. 10:22-24. Hansen and Walker were both unemployed 
and had experience in concrete work. R. 535-37. Both expressed 
an interest in obtaining employment from the agents' phony 
concrete company. Hansen gave Rasmussen his correct name, 
telephone number, social security number, and job references in 
hopes of obtaining employment. R. 508-510, 563-64; VT. 10:28. 
Rasmussen then told Garcia to get job applications for Hansen and 
Walker. Rasmussen told Hansen and Walker he would put them in 
touch with his foreman. VT. 10:29. Walker left the room 
briefly, during which time Hansen continued to talk about his 
work experience. VT. 10:31. 
After giving employment information to the agents, Walker 
and Ingram began discussing with the agents the sale of cocaine. 
VT. 10:32-34. Walker and Ingram agreed to obtain $480 worth of 
cocaine for the agents. Hansen was not involved in the 
negotiations. He never handled the cocaine or made assurances 
about its quality. VT. 10:32-34, 11:16-33; R. 564-65. Hansen 
was not given any of the money. VT. 10:32-36; R. 565-66. 
After Walker had negotiated the price, Rasmussen asked 
who had driven. VT. 10:34. When Hansen indicated he had driven, 
Rasmussen told Hansen to stay behind. Hansen gave his keys to 
Walker and remained with Rasmussen and Garcia. VT. 10:34. 
Contrary to Rasmussen's testimony, there was no indication that 
Hansen was originally supposed to bring back the cocaine. 
R. 524; VT. 10:34. Ingram took the money. VT. 10:34. Walker 
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told the agents that they should "take care of" Ingram by each 
giving him a half gram of the cocaine. VT. 10:35. After Walker 
and Ingram left, Rasmussen offered Hansen another beer. 
VT. 10:36-37. 
While Hansen was waiting for Walker and Ingram to return, 
the agents asked Hansen if he sold drugs. VT. 10:39. Hansen 
said that he knew people that sold drugs, mainly LSD and 
marijuana, and that he had sold marijuana in the past. 
VT. 10:39. While they were waiting for Walker, Rasmussen asked 
Hansen if he could trust Walker. VT. 10:40. Hansen assured him 
he could. VT. 10:40. Garcia asked Hansen if he did business 
with Walker. VT. 10:40. Hansen said no, but indicated that 
Walker did not have a car. Hansen said he did not ask for 
anything in exchange for giving Walker rides. VT. 10:40. 
When asked how he made a living, Hansen replied that he 
was a carpenter. VT. 10:40. The agents asked Hansen if he could 
get them drugs. VT. 10:41. Hansen said he might be able to get 
LSD, but would have to contact a third party first. VT. 10:41-
43. Hansen again brought up his work experience. VT. 10:49. 
Hansen also told the agents he could get them marijuana. 
VT. 11:09-10. Rasmussen gave Hansen another beer, and asked 
Hansen how much he made "doing this" and asked if "this" wasn't 
helping him pay the bills. Hansen said no. VT. 11:01-04. 
Hansen again stated that he was just looking for a job. 
VT. 11:04. 
Rasmussen began to complain about the time. VT. 11:07. 
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Hansen said he knew where Walker was going and that Walker had to 
page someone to meet him. Hansen said he wasn't sure whether 
Walker had set up a deal before hand, but that he knew the people 
Walker dealt with did not like anyone coming to their house. 
VT. 11:07-08. When Walker returned, he indicated that he had 
"another customer" and chat there was someone else he had to go 
with. VT. 11:16. Walker commented on the high quality of the 
cocaine. VT. 11:17. When the cocaine turned out to be a quarter 
gram light, Walker called to complain. VT. 11:17. Walker again 
indicated that Ingram should be compensated, but did not mention 
compensating Hansen. In fact, the agents and Walker joked that 
Hansen was the only one not getting compensated. VT. 11:27-28. 
Walker testified that Hansen did not plan or participate 
in the cocaine deal. R. 538. Walker told the jury that he and 
Ingram initiated the deal for their own profit. R. 536. 
Walker's intent in contacting Hansen that morning was to bring 
him to the site to find work as Ingram had told Walker that his 
"boss" might be hiring. R. 535-37. Walker did not tell Hansen 
about the arrangement he had made with Ingram to sell the agents 
cocaine prior to arriving. R. 53 7. 
Hansen never produced any controlled substances for the 
agents. He never took any money from the agents, nor did he take 
the agents to anyone who did sell drugs. R. 519, 566. When 
Garcia called Hansen that night, Hansen did not want to talk to 
him, told him he could not get him any LSD, and hung up. R. 562-
63. 
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Hansen filed a motion to suppress or redact those 
portions of the videotape that were unrelated to this specific 
cocaine transaction. R. 28-30. The trial court allowed Hansen's 
statements that he knew people who sold LSD and marijuana and 
might be able to get drugs for the agents under Rule 4 04(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence to prove intent. R. 223-25. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error when it 
instructed the jury that "any act in furtherance of arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance is a criminal offense pursuant 
to statute." Instruction 22 incorrectly stated the actus reus of 
the offense and allowed the jury to convict without finding that 
Hansen had the requisite intent in violation of due process of 
law. The error was not cured by the admission of a correct 
Elements Instruction because the Elements Instruction 
irreconcilably conflicted with Instruction 22. Because there is 
no way of knowing whether the jury relied upon the Elements 
Instruction or Instruction 22 to convict, reversal is required. 
The jury was not given an accurate description of the 
elements of the offense of arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance. Instruction 21's definition of "arranging" is an 
incorrect statement of the law. The definition of "arranging" 
provided to the jury is in conflict with case law. Hansen was 
prejudiced because the erroneous definition broadened the scope 
of the actus reus of the arranging statute beyond its intended 
reach. 
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There was insufficient evidence to establish that Hansen 
arranged the distribution of cocaine. The fact that Hansen drove 
Walker to the undercover agent's office and loaned Walker his car 
at the request of the agents did not establish that he arranged 
the deal. Hansen did not negotiate the price, handle the drugs, 
or receive compensation. There was not sufficient evidence to 
establish that Hansen had the requisite intent. The agents posed 
as concrete contractors who were looking for workers, and it was 
clear that Hansen accompanied Walker in the hopes of finding 
employment. 
The trial court committed reversible error by admitting 
evidence under Rule 404(b) of discussions Hansen had with the 
agents while Walker was gone about his ability to procure other 
drugs not charged as part of the Information. The evidence was 
not necessary to the State's case. It was not highly probative 
of Hansen's intent to arrange the deal between Walker and the 
agents. It was unclear whether Hansen had the ability or the 
intent to actually procure other drugs for the agents, and in 
fact Hansen never followed through with his claim. Lastly, the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its 
probative value. The error was not harmless because it cannot be 
said with any assurance that the jury was not influenced by the 
evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY SUBMITTING A JURY INSTRUCTION WHICH 
ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT WITHOUT FINDING THAT 
HANSEN HAD THE REQUISITE INTENT. 
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The trial court committed reversible error when it 
instructed the jury that Hansen was guilty of a "criminal offense 
by statute" if he engaged in any act which furthered the 
distribution of drugs regardless of his intent. Instruction 22 
is constitutionally infirm because it allowed the jury to convict 
without finding all of the elements of the offense. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970) . Hansen was prejudiced because Instruction 22 left out 
the element of intent, and lack of intent was Hansen's only 
defense. Even though the jury was given a correct Elements 
Instruction, the error was not cured because there is no way of 
knowing whether the jury relied upon the Elements Instruction or 
Instruction 22 to convict. 
A. Instruction 22 Is Constitutionally Infirm 
Because It Stated That Hansen Could Be Found 
Guilty Of Arranging To Distribute Drugs 
Regardless Of His Intent. 
The State submitted, over defense counsel's objection, 
the following Instruction: 
Under the law in the State of Utah any act in 
furtherance of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance is a criminal offense 
pursuant to statute. 
The text of Instruction 22 was lifted out of context from State 
v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923-24 (Utah 1979), and has been 
quoted in subsequent cases dealing with claims of insufficient 
evidence to establish the crime of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 
1321 (Utah 1986). 
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An elements instruction using the language of the 
applicable statute is in most cases sufficient to explain to the 
jury the nature of an offense. People v. Wadley, 890 P.2d 151, 
155 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). The use of an excerpt from a court 
opinion to embellish the statutory definition of an offense is 
generally disfavored. Ld. Using an excerpt from an opinion as a 
jury instruction is an unwise practice because an appellate 
opinion and jury instructions have very different purposes. 
Language from an opinion may be a correct expression of the law 
in that context, but may not translate with clarity into jury 
instructions. Evans v. People, 706 P.2d 795, 800 (Colo. 1985); 
People v. Colantuono, 865 P.2d 704, 714 (Cal. 1994). 
This case presents a perfect example of the pitfalls of 
lifting a few phrases from an appellate opinion and turning them 
into a jury instruction. The State drafted Instruction 22 by 
directly quoting a phrase from Harrison. Harrison dealt with the 
issue of whether the arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance statute was unconstitutionally vague.2 601 P. 2d at 
923-24. Harrison held that even though the statute did not 
specify what kinds of acts constitute arranging to distribute 
drugs, because the actor must intend the distribution or sale of 
a controlled substance, there can be no confusion as to whether 
2
. Prior to 1987, arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance was a separate offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1) (a) (iv) (1986). The same language of that statute has been 
combined with the distribution statute under Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(1) (a) (ii) . This stylistic change does not alter the substance 
of the holding in Harrison. 
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his conduct is criminal or not. Ld. The Harrison court compared 
the arranging statute to conspiracy statutes which are not 
unconstitutionally vague even though they do not define the actus 
reus because the actor must intend to commit a crime. Id., at 
924. The court went on to state: 
Likewise, in the present situation, the citizen 
is put on notice by the statute that, if he 
intends the distribution for sale of a controlled 
substance, any act in furtherance of an 
arrangement therefor constitutes the criminal 
offense described by the statute. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Ironically, the State's instruction left out the most 
important language of the Harrison opinion, the language which 
focused on intent. As written, Instruction 22 states that any 
act in furtherance of distribution of a controlled substance is a 
criminal offense. Stated that way, the definition of arranging 
suffers from the very constitutional infirmity the Harrison court 
sought to avoid by focusing on the importance of proving that the 
actor intended to illegally distribute drugs. 
Under Instruction 22, if a parent loaned his car to his 
teenage son, and the son subsequently used the car to deliver 
drugs to a buyer without his parent's knowledge, the parent would 
have committed "a criminal offense pursuant to statute." In this 
case, if the jury followed Instruction 22, the undercover FBI 
agents and the paid informant would also be guilty of 
distributing a controlled substance. This is clearly not a 
correct statement of the law. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923-24; Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1994). 
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"An accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the 
offense charged is essential." State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 34 
(Utah 1980); State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Due 
process requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt 
each essential element of the offense. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 
90 S.Ct. at 1073. Failure to include the intent element is 
reversible error. Laine, 618 P.2d at 34. Instruction 22 is 
constitutionally infirm because it told the jury that they could 
find that Hansen had committed the crime of arranging to 
distribute drugs without determining the necessary intent 
element. Id. 
B. The Inclusion Of A Correct Elements 
Instruction Does Not Cure The Error In Submitting 
Instruction 22. 
Instruction 22, though incorrect, cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the other instructions. In this case, the jury 
was provided with a correct Elements Instruction. The Elements 
Instruction does not, however, cure the error. If the jury 
instructions, considered in their entirety, correctly state the 
law, an incorrect phrase or paragraph standing alone will not 
constitute reversible error. But if two instructions are in 
direct conflict, and one is clearly prejudicial, the conviction 
must be reversed because the jury may have followed the incorrect 
instruction. Cooper v. North Carolina, 702 F.2d 481, 483 (4th 
Cir. 1983) . 
For example, in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325, 
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105 S.Ct. 1965, 1977 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), the Court held that 
an instruction which created an unconstitutional presumption that 
the defendant had the requisite intent was not cured by a general 
instruction which stated that intent cannot be presumed. 
Language that merely contradicts and does not 
explain a constitutionally infirm instruction 
will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A 
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of 
the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors 
applied in reaching their verdict. 
Id. at 321, 1975. This principle has been consistently applied 
by Utah courts as well. See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 
321, 326 (Utah 1985); State v. Hendricks, 258 P.2d 452, 453 (Utah 
1953) . 
C. Because Instruction 22 And The Elements 
Instruction Irreconcilably Conflict, There Is No 
Way Of Knowing Which One The Jury Relied Upon To 
Convict. 
In this case, Instruction 22 and the Elements Instruction 
are in direct conflict. Instruction 22 does not merely define 
the element of arranging for the jury, it goes further and 
instructs the jury that it is a crime to commit any act which 
furthers the distribution of drugs. Given the fact that they are 
instructed to "consider all the jury instructions as a whole, and 
to regard each in the light of all the others," reasonable jurors 
would conclude that the "criminal offense pursuant to statute" 
described in Instruction 22 refers to the charged crime. R. 107. 
Instruction 22 is cast in the language of command. It 
clearly sets forth the basis for a criminal conviction 
independent of the Elements Instruction. The Elements 
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Instruction told the jury they must find that Hansen intended to 
arrange to distribute drugs to convict. Instruction 22 told them 
that intent was not a requirement to convict; that Hansen's 
actions alone constituted a crime. There is no qualifying 
language or explanatory instruction indicating which instruction 
the jury should consider. Ultimately, the jury was left to 
choose which instruction to follow. As a matter of logical 
necessity, they had to disregard one in order to comply with the 
other. If they obeyed the Elements Instruction which required 
intent, they had to ignore Instruction 22. If they chose to 
follow Instruction 22 which did not require intent, they had to 
ignore the Elements Instruction. 
This case presents the reverse side of the issue 
confronted by the court in Laine. In Laine, the Elements 
Instruction failed to include the requisite intent element, but 
an "Information" instruction which gave the statutory definition 
of the offense included the necessary intent element. JEd. at 35. 
Laine held that the failure to include the intent element in the 
Elements Instruction was reversible error. Xd. The court 
rejected the State's argument that the error in the Elements 
Instruction was cured by an "Information" instruction that 
included the necessary intent element. Id. 
Here, the Elements Instruction was correct and included 
the intent element, but the "Information" instruction left out 
the necessary mens rea. The Laine court focused on the fact that 
the Information Instruction did not say that the State had to 
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prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. Because the court found this difference sufficient to 
reverse the conviction, the court did not need to address the 
problem of giving the jury two contradictory instructions. This 
is precisely the issue presented in United States v. Perez, 43 
F.3d 1131, (7th Cir. 1994). 
In Perez, the jury was given two instructions on the 
elements of assault with intent to commit murder. The Elements 
Instruction correctly stated that the government had to prove 
intent to kill. An Information Instruction, however, stated that 
the government did not need to prove specific intent to kill. 
Id. at 1134-35. The Perez court concluded that the Information 
Instruction permitted the jury to convict without determining 
that the defendant had the requisite intent. Id. at 1138. 
Because the Information Instruction was directly contradictory to 
the Elements Instruction, it had the effect of eliminating the 
intent element necessary for a conviction. The overall result 
was a failure to instruct the jury on all of the elements of the 
offense. .Id. at 113 9. The court concluded that because the 
error affected the integrity of the proceeding itself, reversal 
was required. .Id. at 1140. 
D. The Failure To Properly Instruct The Jury On 
The Element Of Intent Cannot Be Harmless Error. 
When an instruction leaves the jury with an erroneous 
impression of the law regarding a principal issue in the trial, 
reversal is required. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 80 (Utah 
1981) . The failure to provide an accurate instruction on the 
16 
elements of an offense is "reversible error that can never be 
considered harmless." State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 
1991) (quoting State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985)). 
Instruction 22 deprived Hansen of his only defense. If 
the jury followed Instruction 22 and ignored the Elements 
Instruction then Hansen's intent was irrelevant and the State's 
instruction was tantamount to a directed verdict. See, e.g., 
State v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Instruction 22 left the jury with the unmistakable impression 
that a lack of criminal intent could have no effect on the 
criminality of his conduct. There was little dispute as to 
Hansen's actions as the entire incident was captured on video 
tape. Intent was the critical issue in Hansen's trial. The 
crucial question the jury was required to answer was whether 
Hansen intended to arrange to distribute cocaine, or whether 
despite his knowledge of the drug deal, his intent was not to 
arrange drug deals, but to try to find a job. If the jury was 
properly instructed, they could have found that Hansen gave 
Walker a ride because he wanted to apply for work. They could 
have concluded that Hansen stayed behind and gave his keys to 
Walker simply because the man he was hoping would hire him to do 
concrete work told him to stay behind. 
Because the Elements Instruction irreconcilably 
conflicted with Instruction 22, there is no way of knowing if all 
or part of the jury relied on Instruction 22 to convict Hansen 
and reversal is required. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; Hendricks, 
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258 P.2d at 453.3 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY AN INSTRUCTION 
WHICH INCORRECTLY DEFINED ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
At the State's request, the trial court submitted 
Instruction 21 which states in part: 
"Arranging" means any witting or intentional 
lending of aid in any form of any act in 
furtherance of aiding in the distribution of 
controlled substances. 
Like Instruction 22, the State's definition of "arranging" was 
also taken out of context from Harrison. 601 P.2d at 923. 
"Ordinarily, non-technical words of ordinary meaning should not 
be elaborated upon in the instructions given by the court. It is 
presumed that jurors have ordinary intelligence and understand 
the meaning of ordinary words." State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703, 705 
(Utah 1977). If the court is compelled to supply a definition of 
an ordinary word, the dictionary is a far better choice than a 
phrase taken out of context from an appellate decision. Souza, 
846 P.2d at 1320; Evans, 706 P.2d at 800; Colantuono, 865 P.2d at 
714. 
Cases like Harrison and its progeny are intended to deal 
with a specific issue and fact situation. Harrison held that the 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague. 601 P.2d at 923-24. In arriving at 
3
. Instruction 22 also incorrectly defines the actus reus of 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance for the reasons set 
forth in Point II of this brief. As indicated in Point II, this 
error was prejudicial and requires reversal. 
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the conclusion that the statute gave adequate notice, the court 
stated: 
The statute in question accomplishes this by-
specifying that any activity leading to or 
resulting in the distribution for value of a 
controlled substance must be engaged in knowingly 
or with intent that such distribution would, or 
would be likely to, occur. Thus, any witting or 
intentional lending of aid in the distribution of 
drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed by 
the act. 
Id. at 924. 
The cases quoting this language from Harrison all deal 
with sufficiency of the evidence claims. Those cases stand only 
for the proposition that the facts in each case were sufficient 
as a matter of law to sustain the conviction. The Harrison 
opinion has given appellate courts a helpful guideline in making 
that determination, but was never intended to provide a working 
definition of the word "arrange" for purposes of a jury 
instruction. Given the context in which this phrase was written, 
it is a correct statement of the law. However, taken out of that 
factual and procedural context, the quoted phrase does not 
translate into an accurate jury instruction. Just because an 
appellate court found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 
in a given case does not mean that it is appropriate or desirable 
to borrow the broad language used by the court to reach that 
decision to replace the common sense meaning of the word 
"arrange."4 
4
. Webster7s New World Dictionary, 2nd. Ed. defines "arrange" 
as "to make ready; prepare or plan; to arrive at an agreement 
about; settle to come to an agreement with a person about a thing." 
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A. The Definition Of "Arranging" In 
Instruction 21 Is Incorrect Because It Describes 
An Actus Reus That Is Broader Than Intended By 
Statute. 
By taking the language from Harrison out of context and 
using it as a definition, the State has created a very broad 
quasi party liability to the offense of distributing a controlled 
substance. The State's definition of "arranging" in essence 
describes a form of aiding and abetting. The State's definition 
makes anyone who "lends aid in any form" to one who distributes a 
controlled substance guilty of distribution. The State's 
definition of "arranging" is broader than the intended statutory 
meaning and is in conflict with State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117 
(Utah 1987). 
In Scott, the court held that § 58-37-19 and § 76-1-
103(1) prevented the State from charging a defendant with aiding 
and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance.5 
Id. at 120. The court reasoned that if culpable conduct is 
specifically defined by the Controlled Substances Act, and if the 
definition of an offense in the Act was in conflict with the 
definition of an offense in the criminal code, the Controlled 
Substances Act took precedence. JEd. at 120. Scott argued that 
the aiding and abetting statute was in conflict with the 
arranging to distribute statute, and he should have been charged 
Section 58-37-19 was repealed in 1992. 
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with arranging rather than as a party to distribution.6 The 
court agreed. 
Although the penalty for aiding and abetting 
would be the same as the penalty for arranging to 
distribute, the offenses defined under the aiding 
and abetting statute are different from those 
defined under the arranging section. 
Id. at 120. The court held that the actus reus for aiding and 
abetting in the distribution of drugs was different and broader 
than for arranging to distribute drugs. Id. Because the actus 
reus of "arranging" to distribute drugs was more specific than, 
and in conflict with, aiding in the distribution of drugs, the 
Controlled Substances Act took precedence and it was reversible 
error to instruct the jury on party liability. Id. 
The State's definition of "arranging" is in direct 
conflict with Scott because it essentially creates a broad form 
of aiding and abetting. If "arranging" to distribute were by 
definition the equivalent of "lending aid" in the distribution of 
drugs, then the result in Scott would have been different. The 
court would have found that no conflict existed between the two 
statutes and Scott's conviction would have been affirmed. The 
State's definition of "arranging" cannot be squared with Scott..7 
6
. As noted above, prior to 1987 arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance was a separate offense under Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1986). The same language of that statute has 
been combined with the distribution statute under Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). 
7
. In State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App.) the 
court in dicta stated that Harrison provided a legitimate 
definition of "arrange." This opinion was not central to the 
holding in Pelton which was that Harrison did not render the 
arranging statute unconstitutionally vague. To the extent that 
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B. Hansen Was Prejudiced By Instruction 21 
Because It Was Misleading And Incorrectly Stated 
The Scope Of Conduct Punishable Under The 
Statute. 
It is crucial that the jury receive accurate instructions 
on the elements of an offense. Laine, 618 P.2d at 34; Jones, 823 
P.2d at 1061; Souza, 846 P.2d at 1320. Instruction 21 is 
confusing, misleading, and incorrectly stated the law. 
Instruction 21 stated that any "lending of aid in any form of any 
act in furtherance of aiding" established the actus reus of 
arranging to distribute drugs. This language is confusing nearly 
to the point of being nonsensical. The instructions never define 
"aid" so the State's definition of "arranging" is potentially 
even broader than the aiding and abetting statute. The State's 
instruction was misleading because it precluded the jury from 
applying the more specific, ordinary, common sense definition of 
the term "arranging" to the facts of the case. 
The jury was asked to decide whether Hansen "arranged" to 
distribute drugs by driving Walker to the office and, at the 
undercover FBI agent's request, remaining while Walker took his 
car to buy the cocaine. The prosecutor argued to the jury that 
under Instruction 21, that conduct was sufficient to convict 
because "doing anything in furtherance of the distribution of 
cocaine" constitutes "arranging" under the statute. R. 589-590. 
The ordinary meaning of "arranging" requires a much more active 
role. Had the jury been allowed to apply the plain meaning of 
Pelton adopts the Harrison opinion as a definition of "arranging," 
it is in conflict with Scott. 
22 
the statutory terms to the case, they would have concluded that 
Hansen's passive role did not rise to the level of arranging to 
distribute cocaine. 
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT HANSEN'S CONVICTION OF ARRANGING TO 
DISTRIBUTE COCAINE. 
The evidence in this case was insufficient to support a 
conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1994) .8 
There was no evidence that Hansen distributed, agreed, consented, 
or offered to sell the cocaine. Hansen did not participate in 
the negotiations for the drug sale, did not accompany Walker to 
make the purchase, did not handle the drugs or the money, and did 
not profit from the transaction. VT. 10:32-36, 11:16-33; R. 564-
66. Hansen was not charged as a party. In order to convict, the 
8
. In order to establish a challenge of insufficient 
evidence, the appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting 
the verdict, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
and demonstrate it is legally insufficient. State v. Gray, 851 
P. 2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The evidence supporting the 
conviction was as follows: 
1. Hansen gave Walker a ride to the agents' office. 
2. After Hansen arrived, it was apparent that Walker was 
in the process of selling cocaine to the agents. 
3 . Hansen loaned his car to Walker knowing that Walker was 
going to obtain cocaine for the agents. 
4. At Rasmussen's request, Hansen stayed behind. 
5. Hansen said he knew where Walker was going, and that he 
may have to make a phone call to obtain the cocaine. 
6. Hansen told the agents he could obtain other drugs for 
them. 
A full account of the facts can be found in the Facts section of 
this Brief. 
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jury had to find that Hansen "arranged" to distribute cocaine.9 
Hansen's involvement was limited to providing Walker with 
a ride, and allowing Walker to use his car to make the purchase. 
Though Hansen did stay behind as "collateral" while Walker 
purchased the cocaine, he stayed at Agent Rasmussen's request. 
VT. 10:34. Hansen's statement that he knew where Walker was 
going establishes that he knew something about Walker's illegal 
activities. VT. 11:07-08. However, Hansen's knowledge of 
Walker's criminal conduct does not establish that Hansen arranged 
the transaction between the agents, Walker, and Ingram. Hansen's 
knowledge that a crime was taking place coupled with his presence 
would not even suffice to establish accomplice liability, let 
alone the more narrow offense of arranging to distribute drugs. 
An accomplice is a person who knowingly, 
voluntarily, and with common intent with the 
principal offender, unites in the commission of 
the crime. The cooperation in the crime must be 
real, not merely apparent. Mere presence 
combined with knowledge that a crime is about to 
be committed or a mental approbation while the 
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act, 
will not of itself constitute one an accomplice. 
State v. Ferticr, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1951) . As explained in 
Point II of this Brief, the term "arranging" is not synonymous 
with aiding and abetting. 
Additionally, it is clear from the video tape that Hansen 
accompanied Walker to try to find work. R. 535-38. He gave the 
agents his correct name, social security number, address, phone 
9
. As a result of this incident, Walker plead guilty to 
attempted distribution of cocaine. R. 533-34. Ingram took the 
FBI's money and disappeared. R. 516. 
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number, and job references. R. 508-10, 563-64; VT. 10:28, 10:31. 
The most that could be inferred from the evidence was that Hansen 
knew that Walker was selling cocaine to the agents, and he knew 
that Walker was using his car to purchase the drugs. This was 
not sufficient evidence to establish that Hansen arranged for the 
distribution of the cocaine. 
A review of prior cases shows that there must be evidence 
that the defendant played an instrumental part in arranging the 
distribution of a controlled substance to sustain a conviction. 
For example, in Pelton, the defendant told an undercover agent 
that he would take him to a location where another man would sell 
him cocaine. 801 P.2d at 185. The defendant took the agent to 
the location and the deal was later consummated when the 
defendant was not present. Id. The court held that there was 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance because he "knew that he would 
be the triggering mechanism" which eventually led to the sale of 
cocaine. Id. The "Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally, 
and he was instrumental in arranging the sale of the cocaine." 
Id. at 186. 
The Pelton court's reasoning reflects the holdings of 
other cases involving arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance. In all those cases, the defendant's actions were 
instrumental in setting up the sale of the drugs. In all those 
cases, the defendant played a vital role by preparing, planning, 
or making possible the eventual transaction. See, e.g., State v. 
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Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103, 103-104 (Utah 1983) (evidence sufficient 
where defendant took informant to seller's house, collected the 
money, and purchased the drugs for the informant); State v. 
Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 68-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (evidence 
sufficient where defendant told the informant the cocaine was of 
good quality and that he and the other dealer were partners, made 
attempts to contact the seller, and warned the informant when 
they were followed); State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1321 (Utah 
1986) (evidence sufficient where defendant drove the seller to 
another house where the drugs were purchased, divided the drugs 
between herself and the informant, and told the informant the 
drugs were of good quality). 
Walker's use of Hansen's car to buy the cocaine for the 
undercover agents does not establish that Hansen was 
"instrumental" in arranging the cocaine deal between Walker and 
the agents. Walker negotiated the deal to sell the cocaine 
without the assistance of Hansen or his car. There was no 
evidence that Hansen introduced the undercover agents to Walker 
for the purpose of arranging a drug buy. In fact, Walker 
testified that the only reason Hansen accompanied him to the site 
was to try to get work. R. 535-37. Lastly, Hansen never 
encouraged the sale by discussing the quality of the drugs or the 
price. Because the evidence was insufficient to establish that 
Hansen arranged to distribute cocaine, his conviction should be 
reversed. 
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF HANSEN'S 
DISCUSSIONS WITH UNDERCOVER AGENTS ABOUT HIS 
ABILITY TO PROCURE OTHER DRUGS NOT RELATED TO THE 
CHARGED CRIME UNDER RULES 403 AND 404(B), UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Evidence of the discussions Hansen had with undercover 
agents regarding his ability to procure drugs other than those 
charged as part of the Information was not admissible under Rules 
403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court 
justified the admission of this highly prejudicial evidence on 
three grounds. First, the trial court ruled that the evidence 
was relevant to Hansen's intent. R. 223. Second, the court 
determined that it would be impossible to make sense of the tape 
if Hansen's statements were redacted. R. 224. The court seemed 
to be under the inexplicable perception that if those disputed 
portions of the tape were redacted, other relevant evidence would 
also be lost. R. 224-25. Third, the court noted that defense 
counsel had not provided an already redacted tape. R. 224. 
Because of its inherent inflammatory potential, evidence 
of prior crimes is presumed to be inadmissible. State v. 
Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1997). Prior to 
admitting prior bad acts evidence, the trial court must find 
that: 
(1) there is a necessity for the prior crime 
evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a 
material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its 
special probativeness and the necessity for it 
outweigh its prejudicial effect. 
Id. at 21. Evidence of Hansen's statements was not necessary to 
the State's case and was not relevant to his intent. Any 
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marginal probative value the evidence may have had was outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect. 
A. The Other Crime Evidence Was Not Necessary To 
The State7s Case As Required By Rule 404(b). 
Doporto made it clear that 4 04(b) evidence must be 
necessary. JEd. at 22. Necessity is an independent, threshold 
requirement. Even if the evidence is probative, even if its 
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, the State must 
show that its admission is essential to establishing its case. 
This independent requirement prevents the State from gratuitously 
capitalizing on the highly prejudicial impact of 404(b) evidence. 
The State must justify its use of 404(b) evidence by establishing 
that the evidence is indispensable, unavoidable, or that its 
admission is compelled by the circumstances of the case. 
The entire transaction of the sale of cocaine between 
Walker and the agents was captured on video tape. The State 
presented evidence that Hansen drove Walker to the office, and 
knowing that Walker was selling the agents cocaine loaned Walker 
his car to purchase the drugs, and had some knowledge of Walker's 
criminal activities. Though Hansen's intent was a central issue, 
this was not a case built on circumstantial evidence where the 
State had no means available to establish intent without 
resorting to 404(b) evidence. Though subject to differing 
interpretations, the evidence was straightforward. The fact that 
the State's evidence could be interpreted in different ways does 
not make its use of 404(b) evidence necessary. Nearly every 
criminal trial involves factual scenarios that can be explained 
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in opposing ways. If the mere fact that a given set of 
circumstances is subject to different interpretations were 
sufficient to establish necessity, then Doporto would have 
little meaning. 
It is entirely unclear why the trial court thought that 
redacting these brief conversations would render the entire tape 
meaningless. All of the aforementioned, admissible evidence 
would have been presented to the jury in a clear, understandable 
form. The sequence of events would not have been disrupted. Nor 
is it clear, why, given the technological ease with which even a 
few seconds of tape can be redacted, the court thought that other 
admissible evidence would be lost. Lastly, the court was given a 
very specific list of the type of evidence the defense was 
seeking to redact. R. 28-30. The trial court simply did not 
need a redacted version of the tape to review in order to 
determine whether the narrow class of evidence at issue was 
admissible. 
B. Evidence Of Hansen's Discussions About His 
Ability To Procure Other Drugs Was Not Highly 
Probative Of His Intent To Commit The Charged 
Offense. 
The Doporto court clearly reestablished the once narrow 
scope of admissible evidence under Rule 4 04(b). See, e.g.. State 
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). Doporto held that 
404(b) evidence must be "highly probative of a material issue." 
3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21 (emphasis in the original). "It must be 
strongly probative of a material issue, a probativeness that 
cannot serve as a ruse for showing that the defendant's 
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propensity is such that he is likely to have committed the kind 
of crime charged." Id. at 22. For example, in Featherson, the 
State introduced evidence that the day the charged crime 
occurred, the defendant made nonconsensual sexual advances to two 
other women as proof of the defendant's intent to commit 
aggravated sexual assault. Id. at 427. The court held that the 
defendant's conduct earlier that day was not relevant or 
probative of his state of mind. Id. 
This case is similar to State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). In DeAlo, the defendant was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute. The State introduced evidence that the defendant was 
under investigation for drug trafficking in another state, and 
admitted a "dope ledger" in the defendant's handwriting recording 
drug sales made in California under Rule 404(b) to show intent. 
Id. at 198-99. The court held that uncharged allegations of drug 
trafficking which were unrelated to the charged crime had 
"marginal" probative value on the issue of intent. .Id. at 199. 
Evidence of Hansen's statements that he had the ability 
to procure other drugs was not highly probative of his intent to 
arrange the cocaine deal between Walker and the agents. Hansen's 
claim that he could obtain LSD and other drugs was not connected 
to Walker's sale of cocaine to the undercover agents. The 
statements were made when Walker was gone and did not involve 
Walker. Hansen's main concern seemed to be finding employment. 
Then Rasmussen told Hansen to stay while Walker was gone. Hansen 
30 
did not mention obtaining drugs until Rasmussen asked him. 
VT. 10:39. It is questionable that Hansen had the ability or the 
intent to actually follow through with his claims. The evidence 
supports the notion that Hansen's statements were merely empty 
talk. In fact, Hansen never followed through. R. 519, 566. 
When Garcia called, Hansen retracted his claim that he could get 
LSD and hung up. R. 562-63. 
C. Hansen's Statements Should Have Been Excluded 
Under Rule 4 03 Because The Probative Value Was 
Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect. 
Even if Hansen's statements were admissible under Rule 
404(b) they should have been excluded under Rule 4 03 because the 
minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the 
prejudicial impact of the evidence. "Prior crime evidence has 
inherent and unavoidable inflammatory potential." Doporto, 308 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the 
high risk of unfair prejudice when evidence of uncharged drug 
offenses is admitted in a drug distribution case. In State v. 
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 110-11 (Utah 1988), the defendant argued that 
evidence of uncharged incidents of drug trafficking should not 
have been admitted in his trial for racketeering by means of 
narcotics distribution. After reversing on other grounds, the 
court noted, "We agree with Bell that this evidence has a high 
potential for prejudice. It is distinctly possible that this 
evidence influenced the jury to convict Bell without regard to 
the strength of the evidence on the crimes actually charged." 
Id. at 111. 
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In DeAlo, the court held that evidence of uncharged drug 
trafficking was inadmissible under Rule 403. JEd. at 198-200. 
Echoing the holding in Bell, the court reversed the conviction 
because of the high "probability of unfair prejudice and 
confusion of the issues." Id. Like DeAlo, this case involves 
evidence of drug activity that is unrelated to the crime charged. 
Like DeAlo, the evidence of the uncharged activity is not strong. 
In fact, the evidence of DeAlo's prior drug activity was stronger 
than Hansen's passing remarks to the undercover agents. And like 
DeAlo and Bell, there was a high risk that the jury convicted 
Hansen not on the evidence, but on the belief that he was guilty 
because he is a person likely to engage in drug sales, and on an 
impulse to punish him for the uncharged conduct. Hansen's 
statements should not have been admitted under Rule 403. 
D. The Admission Of Hansen's Remarks To The 
Agents About His Ability To Procure Drugs Was 
Preiudicial Error. 
Hansen was prejudiced by the admission of his remarks to 
agents about his ability to procure drugs. It is important to 
note that the mere fact that the jury could have concluded that 
Hansen was guilty without the improper evidence does not render 
the error harmless. The central question is whether it can be 
stated with assurance that the jury was not influenced by the 
erroneous admission of the evidence. Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 24. In Doporto, the court recognized that the jury could have 
concluded the victim was telling the truth without hearing the 
prior crime evidence. But because the court could not conclude 
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that the jury was uninfluenced by the improper evidence when they 
assessed the defendant's and the victim's credibility, the error 
was not harmless. Id. 
The jury in this case had to determine whether Hansen 
arranged the sale of cocaine between Walker and the agents. It 
is highly likely that the jury was influenced by evidence of 
Hansen's statements. Upon hearing Hansen's claims that he knew 
where to buy drugs, the jury could easily have concluded that he 
was the type of person who distributed drugs, and by virtue of 
his propensity for this type of behavior, arranged the deal 
between Walker and the agents. For this reason, the error was 
not harmless and reversal is required. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Ted Charles Hansen respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence, or, 
in the alternative, reverse his conviction and remand this case 
for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this /6 day of March, 1997. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of Law - Equal protection] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
ARTICLE I, SEC. 7., UTAH CONSTITUTION 
[DUE PROCESS OF LAW.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
§ 58-37-8. PROHIBITED ACTS—PENALTIES 
(1) Prohibited acts A--Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for 
any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to 
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
§ 76-2-202. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECT COMMISSION OF 
OFFENSE OR FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; 
EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person1s 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same; 
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait 
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a 
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
